

**Developments of the Discourse on Justice
in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

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Abstract

The Islamic Revolution, which is a breakthrough in the history of Iran, introduced some new concepts in the arena of national debate. Founded on Shi'ite political thought, this Revolution has in recent years followed a particular theory of justice that has its roots in Shi'ite doctrines, and this is evident in the ideas of Imam Khomeini (r) and the current Supreme Leader. While preserving its originality, the Shi'ite concept of justice has been subject to new readings befitting the requirements of each government. In spite of [continued] developments in the discourse on Shi'ite justice under various governments, Shi'ite principles of the concept of justice have nonetheless been kept intact in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and this shows the presence of a complete theory in the field of political thought in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Keywords:

Islamic republic of Iran, justice, Shi'i, the Islamic revolution of Iran, government, discourse, equity, politics.

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Introduction

Led by Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution is a breakthrough in the history of religious, political, social, and cultural developments in the cultured and ancient country of Iran. What is of vital and national importance in the third decade of the history of the Revolution is re-reading, reviewing and rethinking the principal ideals of the Islamic Revolution. In a passing and brief analysis, three principles, namely 'spirituality', 'justice' and 'freedom', may be deemed part of the cardinal ideals of the Revolution. The people's well-known slogans of 'equity, brotherhood, the just rule of Ali' and 'independence, freedom, Islamic Republic' suggested that the Islamic monotheistic worldview is a ground on which these values may be actualized. However, the greatest concern for Iranians was justice. Having suffered injustice and social-economic discriminations in the Pahlavi system, Iranians resolved to topple the despotic and unjust monarchy in a mass movement.

In this brief writing, we have endeavoured to analyze the development of the discourse on Shi'ite 'justice' in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main question, however, pertains to the standing of this debate in the past three post-revolutionary decades. And in view of the historical and geographical conditions of Iran, we inevitably have to attend to the issue of modifications and interpretations adopted as mottoes by various governments. Thus, we will try to find out the extent to which this revolutionary ideal has emerged in the literature and political actions of politicians serving the Islamic system. However, we will make no attempt to make the concept of 'justice' operational or to judge the performances of governments after the Revolution.

This writing does not concern individuals, parties and the like. We are only concerned with the development of political discourses. Thus we take social and historical analysis of the sayings of policy-makers as our agenda because they, by possessing the means of political power, play the greatest role in the formation of social concerns.

It is the cultural environment, mentality of the time, political, economic and cultural structures and class relations within every social structure that produce such discourses. Having analyzed the scientific, philosophical, religious and literally sayings, we may find the discourses behind them. But this is not within the scope of this writing. Thus we have directed our attempts only at a fundamental question and in this we are able only to produce a primary [form of] literature that will pave the way for extensive studies in the future.

1. Prevalence of the Discourse of Justice in Shi'ism

One of the central concepts which occupied minds since the beginning of the formation of the polity is the concept of justice. Since ancient times political thinkers have been seeking ways of alleviating existing inequalities and replacing them with equitable and just relations. In the Holy Quran, two terms '*adl*' and '*qist*' have been used to speak of the concept of justice and this Divine book has enumerated establishment and development of justice among the important goals of the prophets. 'We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scripture and the Balance, that mankind may observe right measure'. 'Allamah Tabatabai has written that right measure (*qist*) means justice. 'To observe right measure means to act justly and to observe justice. Thus "those who may observe right measure" means those who attempt to observe justice in the most perfect manner. The nearest factor and the most perfect cause to observe rights is this very quality' (Tabatabai, undated, vol. 9, p.171). Besides these two concepts and their derivatives, the Holy Quran also mentions opposite concepts like injustice (*zulm*), oppression (*jawr*) and the like, terms which need not be overlooked if we are to explain [and understand] the concept of justice.

Justice has been a canonical and central concept in Islamic philosophical, juridical, theological and mystical domains. Farabi, Firdawsi, Sayyid Haydar Amoli, Khwajah Nizam al-Mulk Tusi and in the current century Professor Mutahhari, Dr. Shari'ati, Seyyid Muhammad Baqir Sadr and Imam Khomeini (r) all believed justice was fundamentally important, and this is a reflection of the Shi'ite approach to 'justice'.

Justice is so important in Shi'ism that it has been regarded as one of the five major principles of religion. Because of particular attention paid to 'justice' in Shi'ism, the Shi'ite government has been called the 'government of justice'. The first instance and the most eminent model of justice is Imam Ali (a) and the short-lived 'Alawi government. He was so well-known for his justice that when he was martyred the masses and the elite alike said that 'because of the strength of his justice, he was martyred in the prayer niche' (Amadi, 1366/1987, vol. 2, p.264).

For the Infallible Imams (a) and in particular for Imam 'Ali (a), justice is the bedrock of all moral values. George Jordac writes: The main reason why 'Ali ibn Abu Talib accepted the office of the Caliphate was because social justice was in danger (Jordac, 1970, vol. 1, p.155). For Imam 'Ali (a), 'What guides politics along the right path is justice', and beyond justice there is no criterion for administering society and policies (Amadi, 1366/1987, vol. 19, p.6; and vol. 1, p.190). He thinks the stability and legitimacy of government depend upon observance and establishment of

justice because ‘The rule of he who acts justly is accepted’ (Ansari Kermani, 1377/1998, vol. 1, p.198) and ‘he who does justice in his rule will become needless of other people’s help’ (*Nahj al-balaghah*, letter 153) and ‘the best thing which makes the rulers happy is establishment of justice in the State and obtaining the people’s consent’ (Amadi, 1366/1987, vol. 1, p.198).

In this way, Imam 'Ali (a) extends the conceptual scope of justice in the Shi'ite thought beyond morality and individual spiritual wayfaring into the realm of politics. This is not an uncommon point [mentioned] in hadiths and narrations quoted from Imams (a). Though it is not within the scope of the present writing to determine limits and boundaries of Shi'ite canonical law (*shari'ah*) and rules, we may nonetheless allude to the fact that in Shi'ite thought the moral value of justice has been defined both in the social and individual realms, as well as among the fundamental principles of religion. It is for this reason that the Imam 'Ali (a) says that justice regulates government and is followed by stability of the government, and that he who commits injustice loosens the foundations of his government (Hurr 'Amili, undated, vol. 6, p.17). The other Infallible Imams (a) also see justice as the the foundation for stable government and have considered observance of ‘the right measure’ to be the goal of Imam Mahdi’s government (a).

Professor Mutahhari describes the various aspects of justice in this manner: In the Islamic convention, justice is divided into Divine and human justice. Divine justice is divided into existential and legislative justice, and human justice is in turn divided into individual and social justice (Murtada Mutahhari, undated, p.47). According to him, individual justice is the basis of social justice, whereas Divine justice and faith are the underpinnings of individual justice. Therefore individual justice is also extremely important. That is why religious texts have stated that a Muslim ruler should be just. No internal development may occur without the realization of social justice, and external betterment will not happen unless there is some [kind of] internal and individual advancement. In the social domain as well justice influences all [public] aspects. In the economic field, people should enjoy some suitable and favorable level of livelihood, and all people should be able to enjoy cultural and social facilities. There should be many opportunities in the political realm so that people may not feel that they are alienated.

In this way and through a comprehensive approach, the Shi'ite school of thought has brought together four conceivable aspects of the concept of justice. These four aspects will be realized only if individuals are committed and the political system pays attention to them. Because of the comprehensiveness of the Islamic canonical law, which is one of the fundamental Shi'ite hypotheses in the political field, man’s perfection

requires all aspects of justice. That is to say, the individual, social, Divine and human aspects of justice have to be provided. This consistence has obliged all moral values to define their relations with these foundations. Meanwhile, as has been said above, in Shi'ism justice, as the pivotal principle of moral, individual and social values, defines the conceptual limitations of other moral values. Even freedom is defined on the basis of this cardinal principle.

Shi'ite exegetes' interpretations of Qur'ānic verses appertaining to justice are indicative of the prevalence of the discourse on justice among Muslims. Expositions of historical events like the martyrdom of Imam Husayn (a) demonstrate the special position that justice enjoys in the Shi'ite frame of mind.

Together with such historical confirmations, Shi'ite traditions signify that in Shi'ite political debates the principle of justice takes priority. Because of being Shi'ite, the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and governments which came to power in this Islamic system were obliged to pay special attention to this principle. It goes without saying that without taking into account this principle none of these political institutions may call themselves 'Islamic' in general and 'Shi'ite' in particular.

2. Establishment of the System on the Basis of Islamic Justice

As the fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, justice has been distinctively manifest in the Constitution and in the sayings of the leaders of the system.

In the political insight of the Constitution and of the Supreme Leader, which are two pillars of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, - one of which is a representation of the public opinions and the other is appointed through the Infallibles (a) by God - justice is regarded as a foundation. This shows the importance of the pivotal principle of the Islamic and Shi'ite canonical law (*shari'ah*) in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And apart from the fact that in the Shi'ite tradition justice is a pivotal principle, 1978 revolutionaries struggled against the monarchy under the slogan of seeking justice.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been formulated on the basis of justice. According to the 9th clause of Article 3 of the Constitution, which pertains to abolition of all forms of undesirable discrimination and provision of equal opportunities for all in both the material and intellectual spheres, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to realize the principle of the Islamic justice. In Article 19 of the Constitution, 'justice' has been

mentioned as follows: All people of Iran of belonging to every ethnic group or tribe enjoy equal rights, and color, race, language and the like do not bestow any privilege.

Article 20 has spoken of the establishment of justice in acting according to the Constitution: All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in conformity with Islamic criteria.

Article 156 of the Constitution has spoken of justice in legal verdicts and regards the judiciary as the protector of the rights of the individual and society, and as responsible for the implementation of justice.

Article 14 of the Constitution introduces 'justice' in treatment with non-Muslims; and according to which the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is duty bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity and to respect their human rights. The Iranian Revolution occurred while there was a conflict between Eastern and Western worldviews. During this period Leftists tried to provide synthetic political concepts with the intention of combining the spirit of the Constitution with Leftist doctrines. On the other end of the political spectrum revolutionary leaders provided from the Islamic-Shi'ite heritage some alternatives to foreign political ideas, and this has influenced various Articles of the Constitution. More than anything else, our Constitution, as the essence of public will, has put emphasis on the principle of justice. And since Shi'ism is the official religious school, no other concept than the Shi'ite one has been considered by the legislator.

This has been (and is) the concern of the leaders of the system as well. Imam Khomeini (r) has said: In their struggles and fights against their opponents prophets did not seek to conquer countries and take power from the enemies. They intended to create a just system through which they might execute God's laws (Imam Khomeini, 1379 AHS, vol. 6, p.77). According to a tradition the Holy Prophet (a) defines establishment of justice as the goal of the Iranian Revolution. But in what follows he discusses the definition of justice in the Islamic system so as to render transparency to this reading of justice. To describe the goal of the Revolution and define justice, he says: Islamic justice is what we want to implement in this country. That is, the very Islam that is not willing to subject even a Jewish woman who is under the protection of Islam to oppression. The same Islam about which Imam Ali (a) stated 'It is as much a blame for us to die as to see an enemy army come and take off the anklet rings of a Dhimmi Jewish woman'. This is the kind of Islam we are talking about. The Islam where there is no oppression

whatsoever; the Islam where the highest and lowest subjects are equal before the law. The thing that rules in Islam is divine law... It is the law that rules. A person is no ruler, even if that person is the Messenger of God himself or even a caliph of God's Prophet. It is the Holy Qur'an and the tradition of the Noble Messenger [which rule] (Imam Khomeini, 1370 AHS, vol. 9, p.42). Elsewhere he introduces establishment of the Islamic justice as the goal of the Islamic Republic, and believes that under the auspices of Islamic justice all people will live in freedom, independence, and wellbeing (Imam Khomeini, 1370 AHS, vol. 8, p.81).

According to the Supreme Leader as well, the most important necessity of our society is justice. In his speeches he has explicitly introduced justice-based discourse as the pivotal concern of those who are in charge. He has said: Discourse on justice is important. It is everything we have. Without it, the Islamic Republic has nothing to talk about. We have to have it (Niknam, 1384/2005, p.136). 'This discourse should be generalized so that each and every movement, person, party, or wing which comes to power find themselves forced to submit to this discourse. In other words, they should be forced to endeavour for the establishment of justice and try to raise the flag of justice. This should be protected by you.' (Niknam, 1384/2005, pp.136-7). In spite of the emphases put by the Supreme Leader on the necessity of generalization of the discourse on justice in the country, we have been witnessing ups and downs in this discourse in various periods of the history of the country. According to the Supreme Leader, provision of intellectual and philosophical support for this discourse is a historical necessity. To carry this out, the present study tries to pay attention to the kinds of interpretations of the concept of 'Shi'ite justice' in the public domain provided by various governments in Islamic Iran. Once again, we emphasize that in this short study we are not at all going to evaluate practical consequences of attempts made by various governments. Rather, we will only discuss the status of discourse on justice in the intellectual environment in each one of the governments in Islamic Iran.

3. Development of the Discourse on Justice in the Political Literature of Governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran

3-1. Mahdi Bazargan: Justice in the Light of Small Government

The first prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran began his work under critical circumstances and died in an even more critical situation. During this period the revolution was undergoing a phase of establishment and institutionalization. Under such circumstances, political literature was

more than anything else discussing issues concerning consistency of the government. In such circumstances policy makers cannot be expected to follow a single and consistent discourse. Positions adopted by those in charge of political affairs originated not from theoretical conceptions but from sudden historical developments, which are inevitable in the period of transition.

Because of his leanings to the ideas of classical liberalism in economic and political fields, Bazargan tried to reconstruct and establish institutions on the basis of such ideas. During his first days in office he was trying to attain two important goals: firstly, improvement of the structure of government and establishment of a small government and secondly, putting an end to the plurality of decision-making centers. When, Bazargan's government began to work, the institution of government was a large-scale organization in which 1.6 million people were directly working and an approximate equal number were indirectly working. Thus one of the general goals of the Bazargan's government was improvement of governmental bureaucracy to establish a small government. Bazargan says: We should avoid nationalization. I have said several times and repeat this point continuously. Whenever they face a problem, they say 'let's nationalize it and give it to the government to administrate it' ... One of the plans made by the government to transfer from the previous system to the Islamic Republic is trying to confer people's affairs to themselves (*Problems of the First Year of the Revolution*, undated, p.49). But not only did Bazargan not manage to do so, but rather after his premiership ministership we find a larger governmental body and a more complicated governmental bureaucracy (Ali Babayi, vol. 1, 1384/2005, pp.168-9).

The second goal of the interim government, however, was preventing plurality of decision-making and executive centers. In the first months after victory of the Revolution there was continual appearance of executive institutes working parallel to the government. This made Bazargan complain in his various speeches that the presence of assemblies and committees which had undertaken some parts of executive activities of the government. In an interview with *Le Monde*, he mentioned the presence of various decision-making centers as a problem for the government (Ali Babayi, 1384/2005, vol. 1, p.174).

In the slow process of forming a Bazargan was under pressure from two sides: on the one hand, revolutionary movements did not approve his conservative approaches to foreign interventions as well as non-Muslim pressure groups and hence forced him to revise his decisions (Razavinia, 1362/1983, pp.65-8). On the other hand, the political ideas of Bazargan and

the interim government were not in harmony with the social and political conditions of Iran. Thus they were not welcomed by Iranians in that period. In his last interview, Bazargan mentioned his failure to establish a concentrated and small government as the reason behind his resignation.

To establish a consistent government, he tried to avoid using revolutionary parlance as much as possible, but the prevalent discourse in the early days of the Islamic Revolution of Iran had revolutionary content originating from justice-seeking and Shi'ite doctrines.

Bani Sadr took the reins of power after Bazargan and introduced himself as a powerful economist. Governments after Bani Sadr came to the scene under the slogan of economic justice. It goes without saying that this confirms the claim that Iranians regarded economic problems their main concern, and the collective wisdom of Iranians was engaged with economic inequalities. Under such conditions, inclination toward conservative discourse in which economic concerns were left to the nation could not be accompanied by public attention. On the other hand, Iranians' revolutionary idealism which, in some cases, crossed over geographical borders and shouldered ideas of justice and freedom for Muslims throughout the world did not see [realization of] its own wants in 'step by step progress' and priority of reconstruction of the national government to idealist ideas. Thus, the voice of the interim government was lost in the clamour raised after the Revolution, and Bazargan's 'Small government' collapsed soon as a marginal current.

Under critical conditions of the Revolution, weak relations and weak harmony between the interim government and the Council of Revolution caused some conflicts between the two new-founded institutions. Having begun to work since February 4, 1979 Bazargan's government came to an end when the prime minister resigned after nine months on November 6, 1979. Till the first presidential election in which Bani Sadr was elected as the president, the country faced various affairs which led finally to election of Shahid Rajaei as the second president (Sediqi, 1362/1983, pp.156-7).

3-2. Muhammad Ali Rajaei; Justice as Struggle

Shahid Rajaei was appointed prime minister on the 21st of August 1980. Though his government was short-lived, it may loosely be said that a single movement may be found in this government. To understand the discourse governing the intellectual environment of Shahid Rajaei's government, discursive components of the government should be studied while historical and social conditions of that period are taken into consideration. After the interim government which moved against the current of Revolution, this time

a prime minister from among Revolutionary forces had come to power. Thus the environment of the discourse totally changed. Unlike Bazargan who was always concerned with the government and its affairs, Rajaei was always speaking to the people (Esmaili, 1380/2001, p.86).

When Rajaei came to power revolutionary discourse was once again revived. In all his speeches Shahid Rajaei spoke to people. But, since idealism ruled the revolutionary discourse after the Revolution, Shahid Rajaei's audience was extended from the Iranian nation to cover all the oppressed and deprived people of the world (Rajaei, vol. 1, 1361/1982, p.148). Though Bazargan tried hard to depict the government's limits and borders and reduce the number of non-governmental and quasi governmental institutions, for Rajaei there was no boundary between the government and the nation. According to him one of the values of Revolution was to divide the government among the people. The people's presence in government related affairs was regarded as a value. Besides, Rajaei saw himself as a part of the nation (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.185).

Neglecting boundaries defined between the nation and the government, Shahid Rajaei adopted a populist approach which was clearly reflected in his political and economic positions. Intermixed with the revolutionary values, this kind of populism was considered as a solution for the war problem. Here, another component of the particular historical conditions which formed the discourse of Shahid Rajaei's government is clarified. In most of Shahid Rajaei's speeches numerous allusions to war and resistance may be found. On the other hand, this phenomenon which was imposed on the Iranian society (namely war) is represented in the concepts of the 'Eastern and Western colonialism' and 'contentment'. Since Shahid Rajaei was working under conditions of the revolutionary discourse, to face the war he sought for help from a concept rooted in ideological discourse, namely 'Eastern and Western colonialism'. To depict the concepts of the imposed war and resistance, this concept is of a paramount importance (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.148).

It is under such historical and environmental conditions that the justice-based discourse is shaped in Shahid Rajaei's thoughts. Influenced by the tradition of resistance, what was distinctly represented in the political literature of Shahid Rajaei's government was justice as struggle against oppression. Because of war conditions, he interpreted justice on the basis of this phenomenon. In this way, two components of political the discourse of Shahid Rajaei's government are put together, namely an ideological interpretation of the social phenomena and struggle against oppression as a concept equivalent to justice. These two components are manifest in a *hadith*

of Imam Husayn (a) which was repeatedly quoted by Shahid Rajaei: 'Verily life is belief and struggle for it' (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.196). Influenced by this kind of interpretation of justice, the economic concept of justice is shaped. Shahid Rajaei was always emphasizing that 'In the period of war, some particular economy should be observed'. This particular economy was influenced by the Islamic worldview (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.197). This understanding of the Islamic economy, however, was enjoying two characteristics of equality and contentedness. In this period, war conditions and foreign sanctions had changed the struggle against consumerism to a historical necessity to realize social justice to which Shahid Rajaei was committed both in his personal conduct and his political thoughts (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.46). On the other hand, allocation of the limited resources was a necessity which was in harmony with populist ideas of this great martyr (Rajaei, 1361/1982, vol. 1, p.238). In this period which was the beginning of new circumstances for the Iranian economy, such an emphasis could be very useful because, due to the economic growth caused by increase in oil price late in the Monarchic period, the culture of consumerism continued to live even in critical conditions of the Iranian economy as well. On the other hand, there was no sufficient time to build new capacities and improve economic structure, and this led to sudden inflation early in the 1360's (Azimi, 1374/1995, pp.268-9). Under such conditions, there was no option but to appeal to the two aforesaid characteristics as necessary ways to realize social justice.

This idea, however, was not given sufficient time to live as a universal discourse because after the deposition of Bani Sadr and election of Shahid Rajaei as the president, the new government with Shahid Bahonar as its prime minister had only two weeks to introduce its ideas before it came to an end. The president and the prime minister were both martyred on August 30, 1981 and administration of the government was left to Ayatollah Mahdavi, the then minister of the state. Two important points had overshadowed administration of the affairs of the country and unstable conditions during November 1981: firstly, new elections, and the secondly, encounter with the unrest springing from actions made by terrorist groups. Thus, to follow the discourse of justice in the governments of the Islamic Iran, we have to wait until the election of Ayatollah Khamenei as the president and Engineer Mir Hossein Musavi as the prime minister.

3-3. Mir Hossein Musavi: Justice and Correction of Social Relations

This period begins when the imposed war was at its climax and ends when war comes to an end. That is why Mir Hossein Musavi's government should

be called the government of the Imposed War. On the other hand, though in these years revolutionary and ideological literature was prevalent in political discourse, the only goal was not development of the ideals of the Revolution but also extension of the power of governance and regulation of the society at its top because in the ceremony of enforcement of Ayatollah Khamenei's presidency Imam Khomeini (r) called this period 'the beginning of establishment of the Islamic governance'. When Imam Khomeini (r) regarded protection of the system as the most important obligation, and even emphasized its precedence over the prayers, it was natural to interpret political insight so that it might proceed to some kind of scientific rationality. Though the previous governments had paid attention to the ideals, values and goals of the Revolution, in the period of establishment, the government had to pay particular attention to ways of attaining these ideals as the 'obligatory preliminaries'. Though Engineer Musavi always noted that his government followed the same policies adopted by Shahid Rajaei and Shahid Bahonar, there was considerable difference between qualities of their plans. A contentual study of the sayings of the statesmen and policy-makers in this period will show that in these years 'social justice' had been the most important concern of the government. In the concept meant by the government of 'justice', Engineer Musavi had the Oppressed in his mind (Ettelaat Daily, August 24, 1986). When the Constitution was still a new document and with a view to 'uprooting poverty and deprivation' as emphasized in the Article 43 of the Constitution, Engineer Musavi regarded 'uprooting deprivation' as one of the instances of the practical plans to attain Islamic justice, and insisted that 'security of the Revolution depends upon uprooting poverty and being at the service of the Deprived' (Ettelaat Daily, August 29, 1987). Particular attention paid in this period by the prime minister to the lower classes seemed to be natural for, because of its essence, capital is inconsistent with war and instability. To protect stability, the government had to approach the lower classes. This particular attention paid to the lower classes of the society caused the economic approach of the government to be inconsistent with the open market in this period, and to be inclined mostly to populist and welfare economic ideas. When the leftist economy was prevalent in the 1980's, it was natural for economic approaches of such currents to be reflected in the governmental plans (Bashiriyeh, 1381/2002, p.43). Thus, intervention of the government to regulate the market was regarded as an undeniable principle which was necessary to realize social justice (Ettelaat Daily, August 29, 1987).

In a pamphlet called 'Our Positions', in which positions of the Islamic Republic Party concerning political and economic issues have been

introduced, Engineer Musavi has proceeded to describe his own plans. In this pamphlet, this kind of economic inclination may be clearly seen in the ideas followed by his government. In a part of this Pamphlet, it has been said: In the economic system of Islam, grounds of exploitation by capitalists and those in charge of the labor forces should be eliminated and uprooted totally. Cooperative ownership is ownership of a production or service unit by a group; and only those are able to have some share in this unit who are working productively in it. In the economic system of the Islamic Republic, no ground should remain for governance of capital. That is to say, it should not be the case that he who is wealthy may be able to speak politically. The main problem in the capitalist systems is the very governance of capital. To succeed in economic aspects of the Revolution, emphasis should be put on planning and making use of our natural and human resources in as regulated a manner as possible (Ettelaat Daily, August 30, 1986).

In the above-mentioned Pamphlet, Eng. Musavi mentions necessity of planning to administer the country and regards inflation as one of the characteristics of the capitalist systems. He says: The structure of the Islamic economy emanates from moral-social organizations and in turn organizes them. National wealth should be used in a way that all people may grow and flourish, and all the oppressed layers should be taken into account ... In our economic system, all kinds of exploitation of the labor force should come to an end and, according to the Constitution, work tools should be given to those who are able to work (Ettelaat Daily, August 30, 1986).

But, according to Engineer Musavi, this definition of justice had been provided on the Islamic reading of the framework of justice. Because of his social place among the ideological forces as well as members of the Islamic Republic party, Engineer Musavi explained any reading of justice in proportion to its Islamic concept: The principle of social justice and protection of the Oppressed has not been communicated by the government, but rather the government has learnt this principle from Islam, the clergy and ordinary masses of people. And in the same way that the government has managed to act upon this principle in many cases, in some cases, the government has not managed to do so and in our revolutionary society, which is full of love for social justice, it should be proved that the market is advocating for the Oppressed (Ettelaat Daily, November 11, 1985).

Economic pressures caused by war and reduction in the country's export income forced the government to approve an urgent two years plan for the years 1365-66 [AHS] whose aim was to prevent problems from worsening and to struggle against inflation. In this plan, attempts were made to change the pattern of consumption and to produce and supply the minimal

livelihood needs of people (Razzaghi, 1378/1999, p.178). Because of the special conditions of these years, war, inflation, stagnation in production and trade prevented the government from making long-term policies in the period from 1362-1366 [AHS] and consequently seasonal and temporary decisions replaced long-term strategies (Najafi, 1375/1996, p.5). Nevertheless, discourse on social justice for the lower social classes was still in various governmental agendas and this line was followed for eight years.

To realize the ideal of social justice, the government increased its interventions in all fields of economy, control and supervision so that existing resources might be organized in a better and consistent way. On the one hand, to keep its own dynamics, the government went to establish revolutionary institutions such as the Jihad of Construction and strengthen the cooperative sector. These measures allowed the government to redistribute resources among various social classes to increase economic capacity of the lower classes of the society (Ettelaat Daily, August 16, 1985).

The system of coupons and allocation of suitable subsidies to featured goods allowed Musavi's government to, in addition to providing war costs, undergo some ups and downs in the period of establishment. In this period, many domestic industries, banks, insurance, agricultural, and building companies were nationalized. Foreign trade was directly supervised by the government. In this way, governmental control policies and engineering of the economy, which are among characteristics of leftist economies, were developed in this period, and public supply as well as economy were reconstructed in proportion to the discourse of social justice (Kashi, 1379/2000). Usages the term 'the Oppressed', which is in a way is a synonym for 'low income classes', show the direction of the economy and the government's view to meet the fundamental concern of this period, namely filling the gap between the wealthy and the poor.

3-4. Hashemi Rafsanjani; Justice as Development

Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani's government was the beginning of new circumstances in the Islamic Iran. On the one hand, instability of the country in the early years of the Revolution and the period of establishment of the Islamic government had come to an end, and on the other the imposed war had left its serious economic and social impacts for the new government. When the imposed war came to an end, policy makers turned their attentions from the foreign phenomena to the domestic situation. This attention to domestic affairs led to great changes in the cultural, economic, and political fields. In the field of domestic politics in these years, political wings were reconstructed as left, right, and technocrat ones. In the cultural field, views

found more diversity in the context of native and non-native cultures. In the field of economy, some turn took place toward the market and to strengthen industries which was accompanied by some ups and downs.

In the government of 'construction', the discourse on justice experiences a new development. Unlike the approaches adopted by the previous governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran to justice, in the discourse of justice in Hashemi's government, those who had assets as well as the upper part of the social pyramid were addressed. This approach was intertwined with some sort of pragmatism which showed the style and form of acts taken by the government. This government was of the opinion that it is through increase of capital that justice may be provided as enjoyment of all social classes of economic power and education of the poor. Thus, the main goal of this government was economic growth and construction, and to attain this important goal, Hashemi Rafsanjani established the government of 'construction'.

Members of this government were technocrats who tried, through a less ideological approach, to define politics and the economy in a realistic way. Thus, attainment of national interests in foreign policy and economic development was taken as the first priority in the plans of the new government (Azghnadi, 1381/2002, pp.9-16). Thus, the main goal of the new government in the field of economy was defined as follows: If we are economically strong, we will be able to talk at an international level. We will have a good ground for the Islamic thought if we make ourselves in a way that we may have no weakness, be really independent and break the chains of dependence (Ettelaat Daily, June 30, 1992).

But, unlike the previous governments, the economic view of Hashemi's government was not against the current of world economy. Because of collapse of the Soviet Union and reduction of the influences of structuralist theories, inclination to the market economy was strengthened. For this reason, the 1990's may be regarded as a period of revival of rightist movements in economy. In this way, following the decentralization policy adopted by the government, it was agreed that all economic units which had been nationalized after the revolution by the Council of Revolution and governments after it were given to the private sector. On the one hand, while emphasis was put on small government, attempts were made to confer activities in many fields, which were previously under full supervision of the government, to the private sector (Bashiriyeh, 1381/2002, p.83).

Decrease in the government's presence in the field of economy may be regarded as a distinct sign of changes made in approach to the relationship between the nation and the government. In the previous

governments, though no long time had passed after the Revolution, under the influence of the revolutionary discourse then prevalent in political and social environment, the nation was considered as a part of the government but in the political discourse of the period of construction it is managers and technocrats who are bound to plan for people. In this new approach, some kind of elitist view to managers may be found which was previously of a weaker influence. In this way, after the 1360's [AHS], when realistic views to politics were strengthened, in this field, attentions were directed from people toward 'those in charge' and 'managers' of the system. This view in the field of politics was in full harmony with the economic approach of the government of construction.

'Open doors policy' or inclination toward moderation- as adopted in the five years plan of Hashemi's government- was adopted to formulate a long-term strategy to improve the country's economic circumstances. Though exercising its cultural impacts on changes made in the pattern of consumption and inclination toward 'consumerism', this attempt managed to help to construct economic infrastructures (Afroogh, 1380/2001, pp.246-8).

In harmony with political and economic approach of his government, Mr. Hashemi defines justice on the basis of the extent of enjoyment. Justice is not, in fact, allocation of resources to individuals and re-distribution in accord to people's needs. Rather, justice lies in people's activities and continuance of their economic life. That is why justice has some necessary preliminaries in the field of economy which are provided through economic development (Ettelaat Daily, May 9, 1995). In this way, in the period of the 'government of construction' the discourse on justice in the system of the Islamic Republic was somehow redefined according to the government's economic goals. In this period, the discourse on justice was speaking to the upper part of the economic and political pyramid because this part possessed of the expertise and ability necessary to strengthen large-scale economy and push forward economic development. Instead of struggle against poverty, in this discourse, attention was paid to increase of wealth and economic welfare and development were regarded as signs for coming close to the true meaning of justice. After his eight years presidency, Mr. Hashemi describes economic consequences of policies adopted by his government, evaluates and gives scores to them. He thinks that these scores are good signs showing that justice was extended and followed up during the period of the construction government (Ettelaat, Newspaper, May 9, 1995).

3-5. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami; Justice and Political Development

Previously Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was the head of government for eight years since 1997.

In this period, new political forces were appointed as top managers who had been mostly among middle managers in Hashemi's government. This new current, with its own new political inclination, introduced a new political discourse in the government's literature which was accompanied by strong 'for' and 'against' reactions (Nazari, 1377-8, p.149). The political discourse of policy-makers of the new government had been directed to the political environment of the society and introduced new concepts such as doctrine of law, freedom, civil society, pluralism ... in political literature.

Because of special attention paid by Khatami to this issue, institutions were more active in this period. In this period, newspapers and journals underwent an unprecedented development, and the society took politics as its own concern. The most fundamental concern of Khatami's government was political development which, in turn, determined his discursive approach to justice. Priority of economic development to political development adopted during the eight years period of construction brought the discourse prevalent in this government close to cultural ideas in the field of politics. This situation was considerably influenced by social origins of the new government as well as forces supporting Khatami's government (Bashiriyeh, 1381/2002, p.187).

In the arrangement of political ideas, each and every doctrine has to choose from among two values: justice and freedom, and this choice is able to determine the fate of that doctrine. As a matter of fact, this choice determines the starting point of that doctrine. If justice is chosen as the deontological starting point of a doctrine, this does not mean that [in that doctrine] freedom is rejected (and vice versa). Both liberalism and Marxism are theoretically committed to moral values of justice, freedom, and equity; but, liberalism takes freedom as its own starting point, and then interprets justice, and realizes equity in the democratic systems by public votes and laws. But Marxism starts from justice, seeks for equal freedom, and considers economic equity as a prerequisite for realization of freedom and justice (Lessnof, 1377/1998, Persian translation, Introduction).

Facing this vital choice, the political discourse of Khatami's government begins to move from the concept of freedom, and interprets other parts of the political literature of the government in the light of this moral value. As a matter of fact, accepting deontological priority of "freedom" to "justice", Khatami tries to determine geographical positions of concepts such as civil society, justice, democracy and the like in his own

theoretical chart. In the first anniversary of 2nd Khordad held in 1998 in Tehran University, Khatami speaks of two important principles, respect for laws and institutionalization of freedom, as the goals of the movement of the 2nd Khordad. In the same speech as well as in his next speeches, however, he emphasizes that the law is a prerequisite to separate freedom from anarchy and despotism. Setting limits for freedom of human beings, we are able to confine and determine freedom within the framework of laws so that it may both have a just aspect and prevent anarchy (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.172). Freedom is so important in the president's deontological system that it is regarded as being important to protect religiosity and justice as well. In other words, freedom may be, by essence, favorable. Besides, since it is regarded as a requisite for justice, it is necessary as a tool (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.117). Justice is defined in the light of freedom. 'When it stood against freedom, justice was harmed; when it stood against freedom, development was harmed ... In the communist world, we saw that economic justice stood against freedom and failed' (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.117).

Taking into account such an approach to the priority or posteriority of justice and freedom in Khatami's political discourse, we can clearly see Khatami's nearness to ideas of the right wing in the field of political thoughts. 'Civil society' is introduced in line with development of freedoms. On the one hand, for Khatami, man is the main axis of all values. Man is, he thinks, the axis of political development and its goal (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.53). As a matter of fact, civil society is a field wherein man's freedom is realized and he is able to determine his own fate. Khatami's special attention to political development emanates from the priority of man to nature in his thoughts. While, to attain technical development, Hashemi's government was concerned with theories of economic development, Khatami's government, with its concern for political development, directed its attention to man and the cultural field (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.172).

In this way, priority of the discourse of political development- or, at least its verbal priority- changed 'justice' into a secondary issue and introduction of justice as the consequence of freedom took this issue to the margins. Happy life, for Khatami, is based on three principles: 'religiosity, freedom, and justice' (Alizadeh and Razavi, 1380/2001, p.227). It goes without saying that one cannot think that Khatami is not a defender of justice; but, it should be noted that in the political discourse of Khatami's government, justice makes sense in the light of the principle of man's freedom. This concept of justice, freedom, and political discourse which was

intended by Khatami, of course, was supported theoretically from within religious thought. According to Khatami, there is no conflict between freedom and democracy on the one hand and religious democracy on the other (Sotudeh, 1378/1999, p.180). In this discourse, values such as justice were second to the value of freedom; and more than being of an economic nature, they were of a political nature. Thus, as compared to the political discourse which was then prevalent in the literature of policy-makers, discourse on justice was in a marginal status. A contentual study of the political literature of this period will confirm truth of this claim. All this, however, does not mean that justice had been discarded in the Islamic system, but rather to describe the place of the discourse on justice as compared to its rival concepts.

3-6. Mahmud Ahmadinejad: Redefinition of Justice on the Basis of Religion

Dr. Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected as the president of the ninth government of the Islamic Republic of Iran when no Iranian or foreign analysts had predicted his victory and the victory of his social and cultural theses. Many analysts thought of his electoral slogans as a repetition of the ideological and revolutionary ideas of 1360s. According to them, such mottos seemed to be unrealistic in the Iranian society. The Iran election of 2005, however, showed that no prevalent wing had understood historical necessities of the Iranian society in a realistic way. In other words, analyses which were then popular, were based on personal presuppositions of analysts more than the social reality of Iran. Though some time should pass before the new government may be analyzed and evaluated, this will not prevent us from providing a description of the present reality of the ninth government, though in an ambiguous way.

To reconstruct the political discourse of the ninth government, we should begin from the essential fact that as much as he is a product of a new movement in the Iranian society, Ahmadinejad is the producer of a new thesis and discourse in the field of Iranian politics as well. Redefining a new thesis, the new government tried to introduce itself as a current against the global society. While the previous governments were trying to introduce economic and political development in the Iranian society on the basis of the economic and political ideas prevalent in the world in a realistic framework by uses made of civil tools, the new president of Iran became a herald of justice-based and kind government.

Posing such critiques, he tried to introduce the starting point of his government in the field of culture, and takes cultural issues as the main concern of the Iranian society.

Though economic and political progress was a part of the government's discourse in its mottos, it goes without saying that the fundamental concern of this government had its roots in the public culture of the society. This concern was, in nature, different from the concerns of previous governments. In the governments of 1360s closeness to the beginning of Revolution and direct encounter with war caused spiritual values to be protected in the country. Thus, governments of this period were less concerned with cultural issues. In the 1370s and till the time when the ninth government came to power, discourses of economic and political development became priorities of the Iranian governments. According to the new government, such orientations were some kind of retreat. The new government's choice to provide a thesis against the present global currents has been more clearly presented in the president's explicit critiques of liberalism as a theory prevalent in the political systems of the world. As a matter of fact, however, Dr. Ahamdinejad's critiques are mostly aimed at anti-religious views of these schools. The present crisis of the world, he thinks, is the crisis of spirituality. Thus he founds his thesis concerning the government on religion (Islam).

Thus, the political discourse of the ninth government started to work with cultural concerns based in the Islamic ideology. In this, striving for justice was defined as the most central and the first principle of this government. Though the ninth government started to work with idealistic ideas, it had a main difference from the previous idealist governments. Before this, idealism was the view adopted by the governments of the transition period and revolutionary conditions in the early years of the Revolution. This time, however, it was one of the governments of the period of establishment which had raised the flag of idealism. This situation was a product of nostalgia for the years when economic and class differences between various social classes of the society were not so extensive. This public nostalgia for realization of equalitarian ideals for all layers of the society led to a public return to the fundamental ideals of the Revolution in the period of establishment.

Emphasizing spirituality along with the concept of justice, the new government extends its own definition [of justice] beyond the frameworks of the existing theories of justice. The new government regards justice as an issue related to four individual, juridical, and social fields which are of importance in Islam because the new government is of the opinion that absence of justice

in three individual, creedal, and social fields in Western societies has caused crises of spirituality and identity. The characteristic which brings the ninth government close to the populist governments of Rajaei and Bahonar- which are repeatedly admired in the verbal literature of the president- concerns the audience of the government. Elite, managers, or political and active organizations of the civil society are not the audience of the ninth government. Rather, it is the masses of people who are addressed by the government. Ahmadinejad addresses the masses of people, and even in the government's executive planning concern for the public is seen more than concern for capital and investment.

Because of this approach, in the process of privatization, instead of ceding governmental companies to individual(s) which did not lead to favorable consequences in the previous governments and made many companies bankrupt, the government proceeded to distribute such companies in various ways between the masses of people. Appealing to solutions such as distribution of the stocks of justice or ceding factories to the deprived classes of the low-income decile are signs of this changed approach.

In this way, the new government tries to follow up two characteristics which seemed not to be corresponding: first, attention to the masses of people; and, second, following up the process of privatization and downsizing the government which was emphasized by the supreme leader. While two previous governments appealed to the large investors to push forward the policies of the minimal government and privatization of the governmental companies, the new government regards people as the factor of success of the process of privatization in the country. In this way, in addition to downsizing the government, through distribution of the governmental assets among the low-income layers, the existing class gap may be considerably reduced. Thus, two goals (privatization and redistribution of assets) are followed up simultaneously. Adopting such an approach, the ninth government calls itself, like Rajaei's government, 'the servant government'. Also, following its motto of justice, it calls itself a government which is at the service of people, 'the just government'. In other words, in Dr. Ahmadinejad's definition, justice in Islam is not other than being in the service of people, and he thinks that this understanding of justice is based on the tradition of the Imams (a): 'Organizations, institutions, and titles in the system of the Islamic Republic have no value other than being in the service of people. All these titles, authorities, possibilities, and processes of works given to us are trusted by people [to us] to be at the service of the people. He who serves the people more is dearer and has more managing value ...'(President's first speech, Mordad, 12, 1384). 'Service is the most

important duty of the government constituting two principle of justice and kindness' (President's first speech, Mordad, 12, 1384).

In Ahmadinejad's motto, which may be regarded as the essence of his political discourse, after introducing the centrality of justice, development and services given to the people, another aspect has been introduced so that repeated critiques made by the reformists of the extremist actions taken in the name of justice in previous periods may be reduced. In the previous periods, some currents took extremist actions in the name of Islam and justice which led to development of violence. Kindness to God's bondmen was a principle showing the appearance of the president's thesis of justice (President's first speech, Mordad, 12, 1384). In this way, under the motto of justice, kindness, and service to God's bondmen, God and progress, Ahmadinejad managed to provide a reading of justice which, while containing historical requirements of the Iranian society, might become the political discourse prevalent in the society. Influenced by some sort of idealism, this discourse was a return to the genuine ideals of the Islamic Revolution which, in the forms of new concerns, had occupied the collective reason of Iranians. The distinct characteristic of this discourse was that it was not a continuance of the political theories of justice existing in the West, but rather it claimed to desing a new way.

Like the revolutionary idealism of the early years of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, this view knew no particular geographical framework. Thus, in Dr. Ahmadinejad's speech in the UN, in his political negotiations with the foreign officials, and even in his letter to the president of the US, this trans-national view was reflected. He prescribes some components to improve the international system, and thinks that observance of such components is a necessary principle for the global society. These are components which are very close to idealist and moral thoughts in the field of international relations which have been, of course, replaced by the moral principle and values of the Islamic upbringing.

Conclusion

From what has been said, it may be concluded that the most fundamental principle in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the important principle of 'justice'. Not one of the governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran has managed to proceed without paying due attention to this principle; but, in each one of these governments, justice has been interpreted in proportion to the spirit of the government's performance. Thus, it may be said that interpretations and functions made by governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to justice have, in a sense, appeared in two general forms;

either governments have tried to actualize justice and sought to define it and make its requirements and grounds operational. In this regard, the ninth government is the most important one and provided a reading of justice which is the nearest one to the principles of the system of Islamic Republic and has taken the most native actions in this concern. But, whether or not this government will succeed to do this (and to what extent) is a question which should be answered in future and studied separately.

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